This survey features three parts. The first one covers the recent literature on domestic (i.e., country-specific) uncertainty and offers ten main takeaways. The second part reviews contributions on the fast-growing strand of the literature focusing on the macroeconomic effects of uncertainty spillovers and global uncertainty. The last part proposes a novel measure of global financial uncertainty and shows that its unexpected variations are associated to statistically and economically fluctuations of the world business cycle.
Introduction
The macroeconomic e¤ects of uncertainty have been hotly debated since the global …nancial crisis. In fact, uncertainty as an element behind consumption and investment decisions has been investigated for a long time. Papers in the 1980s and 1990s unveiled the role of precautionary savings for consumption (Caballero (1990) ) and the optimality of a "wait-and-see" behavior in presence of choices that are costly to reverse, or irreversible (see Eberly (1994) for an application of the real option-theory to durable consumption, Bernanke (1983) , Pindyck (1991) , and Bertola and Caballero (1994) to investment decisions). More recently, Bloom (2009) has moved the attention from the role of uncertainty in steady state to that of driver of the business cycle. Bloom (2014 Bloom ( , 2017 and Castelnuovo, Lim, and Pellegrino (2017) o¤er surveys of the recent literature.
This paper contributes to the discussion on the relationship between uncertainty and the business cycle along three dimensions: i) it o¤ers updates on the main empirical …ndings on the role of uncertainty shocks on the one hand, and endogenous uncertainty on the other. It does so by categorizing the extant contributions into ten di¤erent classes, which are related to research questions. Correspondingly, ten main takeaways emerging from the literature are proposed. These takeaways can be seen as basis for further research questions;
ii) it reviews the fast-growing strand of the literature on uncertainty spillovers and global uncertainty, and highlights questions that remain to be addressed;
iii) it documents a novel measure of global …nancial uncertainty (GFU). This measure is based on proxies for …nancial volatility of 39 countries. Vector autoregressions (VAR) jointly modeling our measure of global …nancial uncertainty and a global business cycle indicator point to a statistically and economically signi…cant negative response of world output to unexpected hikes in uncertainty.
Before moving to the rest of the paper, three notes are in order. First, when referring to theoretical models dealing with "uncertainty", this survey will in most occasions conceptually refer to a mean-preserving change in the second moment of a distribution. For instance, we will think of the economy's response to a change in the volatility of the technology process conditional on an unchanged level of technology. Technically, this concept is actually that of "risk", because it assumes that agents know the probability distribution of the possible outcomes (say, the probability of a better/worse technology materializing in the future). In other words, risk refers to "known unknowns". Di¤erently, "Knightian" uncertainty (from Knight (1921) ) refers to "unknown unknowns", i.e., to uncertainty about the probability distribution generating the data. Recent attempts to empirically distinguish these two concepts are Bekaert, Hoerova, and Lo Duca (2013) , Bekaert, Engstrom, and Xu (2019) , and Rossi, Sekhposyan, and Soupre (2019) .
A second note regards the use of ex-post data realizations (as opposed to ex-ante data, i.e., expectations) in some of the empirical analysis reviewed in this paper. While uncertainty obviously refers to future events, many empirical contributions have employed measures of realized volatility (e.g., realized stock market volatility) to approximate uncertainty. In the data, the correlation between these two concepts is often high. However, at times empirical conclusions drawn by using one or the other may be dramatically di¤erent. For instance, Berger, Dew-Becker, and Giglio (2019) …nd that innovations in realized stock market volatility are robustly followed by contractions, while shocks to forward-looking uncertainty have no signi…cant e¤ect on the economy. Third, the survey will mainly refer to macroeconomic uncertainty. Part of the literature has actually focused on the evidence and e¤ects of microeconomic uncertainty, typically …nding a negative correlation with the business cycle. For a review of contributions related to microeconomic uncertainty, see Bloom (2014) . The structure of this survey is the following. Section 2 reviews the main takeaways of the empirical literature on the business cycle e¤ects of uncertainty shocks, with a focus on domestic uncertainty. Section 3 switches to global uncertainty and spillovers across countries. Section 4 describes the construction of our global …nancial uncertainty measure and documents the outcome of our VAR exercise. Section 5 concludes.
and , and Tran, Vehbi, and Wong (2019) for other industrialized countries).
Using 100 years of consumption data from 16 OECD countries, Nakamura, Sergeyev, and Steinsson (2017) con…rm that macroeconomic volatility strikingly increases in periods of lower growth. The countercyclicality of uncertainty is not just con…ned to the macro-level territory. In fact, it is robust to using micro-based measures of uncertainty such as cross-…rm stock-return variation (Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) ), the dispersion of plant-level shocks to total factor productivity (Kehrig (2015) , Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry (2018)), and cross-…rm price changes (Vavra (2014a) , Baley and Blanco (2019) ).
A natural question is why uncertainty is countercyclical. As discussed by Bloom (2014) , several interpretations have recently been advanced, but their empirical relevance is still debated. Take the case of …nancial volatility. One interpretation for its countercyclicality is that …rms take on more debt during recessions, which accentuates their stock-returns volatility. While this leverage-focused story is appealing, Schwert (1989) …nds the contribution of leverage to the rise of uncertainty in recessions to be no more than 10 percent. Countercyclical risk aversion could also be behind the increase in …nancial uncertainty during busts. However, Bekaert, Hoerova, and Lo Duca (2013) show that the movements in the VIX (a measure of expected volatility of the S&P 500 index) are too large to be explained by plausible ‡uctuations in risk aversion. Baker, Bloom, Davis, and Kost (2019) construct a newspaper-based equity market volatility (EMV) tracker that correlates with the US implied/realized stock market volatilities.
They …nd that 72% of the articles behind their EMV measure refer to the macroeconomic outlook, and 35% to macroeconomic policy (mostly …scal policy). Pastor and Veronesi (2017) point out that the precision of political signals may a¤ect the relationship between economic policy uncertainty and stock market volatility. For instance, the Trump administration has been characterized by many imprecise signals. If …nancial market volatility is the result of economic policy uncertainty times the precision of political signals, …nancial market volatility could fall when signals are imprecise even if economic policy uncertainty remains high. The reason is that investors who are skeptical about politicians'pronouncements and their link to future policy actions downweight such signals. This might explain some phases of the Trump administration characterized by high economic policy uncertainty but low …nancial market volatility. Macroeconomic uncertainty has also been found to be countercyclical. Orlik and Veldkamp (2014) stress that forecasters could be more con…dent in predicting future events in normal times than during recessions, above all extreme event-type of recessions as the 2007-09 one. Forecasters can have troubles predicting how the economy will fare in the future during economic downturns also because of badly communicated, hyperactive (or both) macroeconomic policies (Pastor and Veronesi (2012) ). Indeed, the economic policy uncertainty index developed by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) scores record-high levels during the Great Recession.
Berger and Vavra (2019) study two possible sources of the greater dispersion that many economic variables feature in recessions, i.e., bigger shocks and stronger responses by agents to acyclically-sized shocks. Using a novel identi…cation strategy related to price data in an open economy framework, they document a robust and positive relationship between exchange rate pass-through and the dispersion of item-level price changes. They interpret this relationship in favor of a stronger response during recessions. Kozeniauskas, Orlik, and Veldkamp (2018) deal with three di¤erent types of uncertainty, i.e., macro uncertainty (about aggregate shocks), micro uncertainty (about …rm-level shocks), and higher-order uncertainty (about other agents'beliefs when forecasts di¤er). They set up a model in which …rms estimate the risk of disasters each period before optimally determining their demand for inputs and level of production. This model is able to generate macro, micro and higher-order uncertainty which covary in a realistic way. This is due to the fact that disasters arise infrequently, hence their probability is di¢ cult to quantify and disagreement over it may arise. An increase in disaster risk ampli…es forecast errors (macro uncertainty) and disagreements (belief uncertainty), and lead …rms having divergent forecasts to choose di¤erent inputs and obtain di¤erent outputs (micro uncertainty). Hence, time-varying disaster risk may be behind the ‡uctuations in di¤erent types of uncertainty. Bianchi, Kung, and Tirskikh (2019) employ a model featuring more than one type of uncertainty shocks (a "demand" uncertainty shock, i.e., a shock to the volatility of household's preferences, and a "supply" uncertainty shock, which is a second moment shock to technology). They …nd that both type of shocks imply large real contractions and generate increases in term premia, while supply shocks are relatively more powerful when it comes to explaining in ‡ation and investment.
It is worth noting that the literature has so far largely pointed toward contractionary e¤ects of uncertainty shocks. This fact is informative, among other things, from a model-selection standpoint. In fact, DSGE models can predict short-run expansions in response to jumps in uncertainty. This is the so-called "Oi-Hartman-Abel" e¤ect discussed by, among others, Bloom (2014) . An example of this e¤ect is the response of output to an uncertainty shock in a large class of real business cycle mod-els. Suppose aggregate uncertainty (say, demand uncertainty) increases. If households are risk-averse, precautionary savings kick in and a reduction in consumption occurs.
This generates an increase in households'marginal utility, which stimulates labor supply. If labor demand does not adjust, employment rises and, consequently, so does output. Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana, Kuester, and Rubio-Ramírez (2015) and Basu and Bundick (2017) point out that this does not occur when nominal rigidities (say, price rigidities) are present. In that case, demand-driven output contracts due to the fall in consumption, which also implies (under reasonable parametrizations) a fall in hours and investment. While the business cycle impact of the "Oi-Hartman-Abel" e¤ect is likely to be small, a stronger impact of this e¤ect in the long-run could be in place due to the e¤ects of uncertainty shocks on R&D decisions (Bloom (2014) ).
Obviously, uncertainty shocks having recessionary e¤ects can generate the countercyclicality observed in the data. On the other hand, …rst-moment shocks a¤ecting the business cycle can a¤ect uncertainty. The endogeneity of uncertainty and the business cycle is a challenging issue to tackle when it comes to identifying the causes and consequences of exogenous variations in uncertainty and output. Recently, some researchers have tried to solve this identi…cation issue by focusing on di¤erent types of macroeconomic uncertainty. In particular, researchers have tried to understand the di¤erent information contents of macroeconomic and …nancial uncertainty. This is what we turn next.
2) Financial and macroeconomic uncertainty have di¤erent macroeconomic e¤ects. Ludvigson, Ma, and Ng (2019) use a set of narrative restrictions to separately identify …nancial and macroeconomic uncertainty shocks in a VAR context.
They document a negative response of real activity indicators to a jump in …nancial volatility. Importantly, they show that the reverse is not true, i.e., …rst-moment shocks are not found to cause a response in …nancial volatility (a similar result can be found in Lütkepohl and Milunovich (2016) ). Related results are those by Casarin, Foroni, Marcellino, and Ravazzolo (2018) , who …nd stronger business cycle e¤ects when focusing on …nancial uncertainty as opposed to macroeconomic uncertainty, and by Ma and Samaniego (2019) , who work with industry-level data and …nd that …nancial uncertainty precedes uncertainty in the rest of the economy. The recessionary e¤ects of …nancial shocks have also been documented by, among others, Bloom (2009), Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Groshenny (2014) , Carriero, Mumtaz, Theodoridis, and Theophilopoulou (2015) , Leduc and Liu (2016) , and Basu and Bundick (2017) . Interestingly, Ludvigson, Ma, and Ng (2019) …nd that shocks identi…ed with measures of macroeconomic uncertainty do not trigger a drop in real activity. If anything, an unexpected hike in macroeconomic uncertainty is found to be followed by a short-lived expansion. This result could be due to an endogeneity issue, i.e., it is the business cycle that causes movements in macroeconomic uncertainty, whose ‡uctuations are then endogenous responses to …rst-moment shocks. Ludvigson, Ma, and Ng (2019) stress the role that macroeconomic uncertainty plays in amplifying the e¤ects of …rst-moment shocks and second-moment …nancial disturbances. One possible story for a reverse causal link relating the business cycle and uncertainty is price experimentation by …rms that search for information regarding their optimal mark-up (Bachmann and Moscarini (2012) ). A related paper is Bachmann and Bayer (2013) . They show that a model with correlated risk and productivity shocks matches the data -i.e., the output response to an uncertainty shock -better than a model with risk shocks only.
Other recent empirical …ndings suggest that the Ludvigson et al. (2019) result is not written in stone. Building on Bacchiocchi and Fanelli (2015) and Bacchiocchi, Castelnuovo, and Fanelli (2018) , Angelini, Bacchiocchi, Caggiano, and Fanelli (2019) exploit the heteroskedasticity in Ludvigson et al.'s (2019) measures of …nancial and macroeconomic uncertainty and that of indicators of the US business cycle to identify uncertainty and …rst-moment shocks. They …nd both …nancial and macroeconomic uncertainty to be drivers of the business cycle. Using instruments to identify exogenous variations of the business cycle, A response to Angelini, Bacchiocchi, Caggiano, and Fanelli (2019) and Carriero, Clark, and Marcellino (2019) is contained in Ludvigson, Ma, and Ng (2019) .
One way to achieve identi…cation is to work with instruments for exogenous movements in uncertainty. A recent example is Pi¤er and Podstawski (2018). They exploit variations in the price of gold around uncertainty-related events to construct a proxy for uncertainty shocks. Then, they identify uncertainty and news shocks in a proxy SVAR and compare results to the recursive identi…cation. They …nd the so-instrumented uncertainty shocks to be drivers of the US business cycle. Moreover, they …nd that uncertainty shocks identi…ed recursively look more like news shocks. This result suggests that VAR identi…cation schemes alternative to the often used triangular zero restrictions are likely needed for a correct quanti…cation of the macroeconomic e¤ects of uncertainty shocks. Identi…cation of uncertainty shocks represents a ‡orid research territory for the years to come.
3) Financial frictions amplify the real e¤ects of uncertainty shocks. The interaction between …nancial frictions and volatility shocks has been investigated both theoretically and empirically. Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014) , Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajšek (2014) , Bonciani and van Roye (2016) , Alfaro, Bloom, and Lin (2018) , Arellano, Bai, and Kehoe (2019) , and Chatterjee (2019) build up models in which risk shocks interact with …nancial frictions of di¤erent sorts. While the details of the models di¤er, the robust message across them is that …nancial frictions magnify the e¤ects of bursts in uncertainty. However, no agreement has been reached yet on the size of the "…nance-uncertainty multiplier", which -as de…ned in Alfaro, Bloom, and Lin (2018)captures the additional output e¤ects due to …nancial frictions that materialize after a exogenous increase in uncertainty. Alfaro, Bloom, and Lin (2018) …nd that adding …nancial frictions to an otherwise standard real business cycle model featuring real option e¤ects roughly doubles the negative impact of uncertainty shocks on investment and hiring. Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajšek (2014) work with a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) framework featuring heterogeneous …rms that face time-varying idiosyncratic uncertainty, irreversibility, nonconvex capital adjustment costs, and …nancial frictions. They …nd that, without …nancial frictions, uncertainty shocks would have little e¤ects on the business cycle. Arellano, Bai, and Kehoe (2019) build up a model in which hiring inputs is risky because …nancial frictions limit …rms'ability to insure against shocks. Consequently, a jump in idiosyncratic volatility induces …rms to reduce their inputs to reduce such risk. They …nd that, if …rms had access to complete …nancial markets, an increase in the volatility of persistent productivity shocks would actually lead to an increase in aggregate employment due to the reallocation of resources to the most productive …rms, a reallocation which would generate an economic boom.
The contributions cited above justify the need of jointly modeling uncertainty and …nancial frictions in empirical frameworks. Caldara, Fuentes-Albero, Gilchrist, and Zakrajšek (2016) employs a penalty function approach to identify …nancial conditions and uncertainty shocks in a VAR context. They …nd that, even after controlling for …-nancial conditions and identifying …nancial shocks, uncertainty shocks are an important source of macroeconomic disturbances, in particular when …nancial conditions are tight. Furlanetto, Ravazzolo, and Sarferaz (2019) works with a sign-restriction identi…cation strategy which crucially relies on the information contained in the response of the ratios of variables (e.g., …nancial conditions over uncertainty) for separately identify …rst and second-moment shocks. Their VAR produces a response of investment to an uncertainty shock which features the drop-rebound-overshoot dynamics as in Bloom (2009) . Choi, Furceri, Huang, and Loungani (2018) use a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach to study the impact of changes in aggregate uncertainty on productivity growth in 25 industries based in 18 advanced economies. They …nd that productivity growth falls more in industries that depend heavily on external …nance. Choi and Yoon (2019) model a century of US data and show that, when the response of the BAA-AAA …nancial spread to an EPU shock is shut down, the negative output e¤ects triggered by such shocks are milder. A similar result is found by Bordo, Duca, and Koch (2016) , who focus on the role of banking frictions and …nd them to be relevant for the transmission of EPU shocks. Alessandri and Mumtaz (2019) employ a regime-switching VAR framework to understand if a …nance-uncertainty multiplier is present in the data. They …nd the real e¤ects of uncertainty shocks to be six times larger when a …nancial crisis is in place with respect to when …nancial markets function normally. Lhuissier and Tripier (2019) show that the di¤erences in dynamics across stressed vs. normal …nancial regimes may be due to agents'expectations around regimes switches, with pessimistic expectations about future …nancial acting as ampli…er of the contractionary e¤ects of uncertainty shocks. Popp and Zhang (2016) use a smooth-transition factor-augmented vector autoregression and a large monthly panel of US macroeconomic and …nancial indicators to model possibly nonlinear e¤ects of uncertainty shocks. They …nd such a shock to exert adverse e¤ects on the real economy and …nancial markets, in particular in recessions, due to …nancial frictions. Mapping these …ndings back to theoretical models singling out why …nancial frictions a¤ect the real e¤ects of uncertainty shocks is a promising avenue for future research. Also, understanding the relative importance of uncertainty shocks vs. other shocks in presence of …nancial frictions (e.g., news shocks as in Görtz, Tsoukalas, and Zanetti (2016) ) appears to be relevant from a modeling as well as policy standpoint.
4) The e¤ects of uncertainty shocks are state-dependent. Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Groshenny (2014), Nodari (2014), Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Figueres (2017) , and Chatterjee (2018) …nd that the e¤ects of uncertainty shocks are stronger when an economy is already in a low-growth state. Cacciatore and Ravenna (2018) employ a theoretical model featuring matching frictions in the labor market and an occasionally binding constraint on downward wage adjustment. They show that the e¤ects of uncertainty shocks are in line with those documented by the empirical papers cited above. Pellegrino, Caggiano, and Castelnuovo (2019) work with a nonlinear Interacted VAR à la Pellegrino (2018 Pellegrino ( , 2019 , and …nd the e¤ects of uncertainty shocks to be larger during the Great Recession than in normal times. They interpret this fact via an estimated nonlinear DSGE model in which risk aversion is allowed to be state-dependent and, crucially, higher during the 2007-09 recession (for a related paper, see Bretscher, Hsu, and Tamoni (2018) ). Further explorations on the drivers of the di¤erent macroeconomic e¤ects of uncertainty shocks in booms and busts are proposed in Andreasen, Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Pellegrino (2019) .
In a "new normal" characterized by historically low interest rates, what is the role played by the zero lower bound for the real e¤ects of uncertainty shocks? Johannsen (2014), Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana, Kuester, and Rubio-Ramírez (2015), Nakata (2017) , Basu and Bundick (2017) , and Seneca (2018) propose new-Keynesian frameworks in which the zero lower bound acts as a magni…er of the real e¤ects of uncertainty shocks due to the inability by the central bank to set the real interest rate as low as desired. Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Pellegrino (2017) employ a nonlinear VAR to study normal times vs. the zero lower bound phase in the US. They con…rm that uncertainty shocks have larger e¤ects on output, consumption, and above all investment when the federal funds rate is constrained below. This evidence is in line with the one proposed by recent research studying the e¤ects of …rst-moment macroeconomic shocks in presence of the zero lower bound (Liu, Theodoridis, Mumtaz, and Zanetti (2018) ). (For contrasting evidence, Debortoli, Galí, and Gambetti (2019) and Swanson (2019).) Going back to uncertainty shocks, Castelnuovo and Tran (2017) compare the real activity e¤ects of uncertainty shocks constructed by appealing to information related to google searches. They …nd that such shocks are much more damaging in the US than in Australia. Castelnuovo and Tran (2017) propose the absence of recessions and zero lower bound-type of events in Australia as possible interpretations for the di¤erent real e¤ects of uncertainty shocks in these two countries. A natural question is how to conduct monetary policy when it comes to tackling the e¤ects of uncertainty shocks in presence of the zero lower bound. This question is tackled by Basu and Bundick (2015) , who stress the importance of tracking the ‡uctuations in the real natural interest rate with the policy rate in response to an uncertainty shock.
5) The response of in ‡ation to uncertainty shocks is uncertain. Leduc and Liu (2016) conduct a VAR analysis and …nd that jumps in uncertainty exert demand shock-type of e¤ects, i.e., they increase unemployment and decrease in ‡ation. They interpret this result with a new Keynesian model featuring sticky prices and frictions on the labor market. However, Fasani and Rossi (2018) show that Leduc and Liu's model predictions on in ‡ation can be overturned by modeling interest rate inertia.
In particular, degrees of interest rate smoothing in line with the Taylor rule-related empirical evidence (see Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) , Castelnuovo (2003 Castelnuovo ( , 2007 , Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011, 2012) , and Ascari, Castelnuovo, and Rossi (2011) , among others) lead to an increase in both unemployment and in ‡ation, a response typically associated to a supply shock.
Theoretically, in models featuring price rigidities the sign of the response of in ‡ation to an uncertainty shock is a-priori unclear due to the joint presence of two channels.
On the one hand, the standard demand channel would imply a de ‡ationary response to an uncertainty shock given its negative e¤ects on real activity in most models of the business cycle (for an example of this mechanism driven by precautionary savings, see Basu and Bundick (2017) ). On the other hand, …rms subject to price stickiness have the incentive to set prices above the level they would target in absence of uncertainty to avoid losing pro…ts in case favorable economic conditions realize in the future (Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana, Kuester, and Rubio-Ramírez (2015), Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2015b), Basu and Bundick (2017) ). An analysis on the relative role of price vs. wage stickiness is proposed by Born and Pfeifer (2019) .
Given that these models'predictions on the response of in ‡ation to an uncertainty shock can change depending on their calibrations, guidance from empirical analysis is needed. As noted earlier, Leduc and Liu (2016) …nd uncertainty shocks to be de ‡ationary. However, working with a nonlinear VAR framework, Alessandri and Mumtaz (2019) …nd them to be in ‡ationary in normal times, although de ‡ationary during …nancial crisis. Meinen and Röhe (2018) estimate SVAR models with sign restrictions and focus on the response of in ‡ation to …nancial and uncertainty shocks in the US and Euro area. They …nd such response to be ambiguous. More work is needed to understand the response of in ‡ation to uncertainty shocks. 6) Macroeconomic policies are weaker in presence of uncertainty. Pellegrino (2018, 2019) works with nonlinear Interacted VAR models to show that monetary policy shocks a¤ect the US and Euro area business cycle more weakly in periods of high uncertainty. In his empirical framework, which treats uncertainty as an endoge-nous variable, the response of uncertainty to a monetary policy shock is found to be signi…cant. A similar …nding is proposed by Aastveit, Natvik, and Sola (2017) , and with similar frameworks by Eickmeier, Metiu, and Prieto (2016) , and Castelnuovo and Pellegrino (2018) . This last paper interprets the lower e¤ectiveness of monetary policy shocks in presence of high uncertainty by estimating a (linearized) medium-scale DSGE model in a state-dependent fashion. The authors …nds that, in presence of uncertainty, the slope of the Phillips curve is steeper. Hence, all else being equal, a shift in aggregate demand triggered by a monetary policy shock has a lower impact on output (for a related paper, see Vavra (2014b) ). Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Nodari (2019) focus instead on systematic monetary policy. They …nd it to be less e¤ective in stabilizing the business cycle when an uncertainty shock materializes during recessions, which -as pointed out above -are typically characterized by high levels of uncertainty. A possible interpretation of this result is the di¢ culty of in ‡uencing agents'decisions by policymakers (the central bank in this case) when uncertainty is high and, therefore, the real option value of waiting until the "smoke clears" is high too (Bloom (2009) 
Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry (2018)).
The literature has also investigated the connection between uncertainty and …scal policy. Ricco, Callegari, and Cimadomo (2016) …nd that the e¤ectiveness of unsystematic …scal policy interventions is lower when …scal policy uncertainty is high. This is an interesting …nding, because recent research …nds that …scal spending shocks are actually associated to larger …scal multipliers in recessions (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) , Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013) , Caggiano, Castelnuovo, Colombo, and Nodari (2015) ), perhaps thanks to a con…dence channel (Bachmann and Sims (2012), Figueres (2015)), although not all contributions in the extant literature con…rm this result (Ramey and Zubairy (2018 (2019)). The impact of uncertainty on the e¤ectiveness of macroeconomic policies seems to represent an important research avenue.
7)
Macroeconomic policies generate uncertainty. Monetary policy can generate uncertainty because of issues related to communication and credibility. The same issues a¤ect …scal policy, which is also characterized by delays related to decisions (often di¢ cult in countries where the leading parties do not enjoy a large majority in Parliament) and implementation (…scal policy is typically associated to multi-year plans). Hence, it is perhaps not surprising that both policies are associated to uncertainty. Mumtaz and Zanetti (2013) study the impact of monetary policy uncertainty using a VAR framework featuring time-varying variance of monetary policy shocks via a stochastic volatility speci…cation and a volatility-in-mean e¤ect which allows volatility shocks to a¤ect the endogenous variables of the VAR. They …nd a negative response of the nominal interest rate, output growth, and in ‡ation to a jump in monetary policy volatility. They then propose a DSGE model with stochastic volatility to monetary policy that generates similar responses. Istre… and Mouabbi (2018) quantify monetary policy uncertainty by accounting for both disagreement among forecasters over predictions related to future interest rates and the perceived variability of future aggregate shocks. They use this proxy, which they construct for the US, Japan, the UK, Canada, Sweden, Germany, France, Italy, and Spain, to quantify the e¤ects of uncertainty shocks on these countries' business cycle. They …nd such e¤ects to be large, negative and persistent, with a distinct cross-country heterogeneity when it comes to peak e¤ects. Bundick, Herriford, and Smith (2017) identify monetary policy uncertainty shocks using unexpected changes in the term structure of implied volatility around monetary policy announcements, which they construct following the methodology used to construct the VIX. They …nd that an unexpected decline in the slope of implied volatility lowers term premia in longer-term bond yields and leads to higher economic activity and in ‡ation.
Their results suggest that forward guidance about future monetary policy can materi-ally a¤ect bond market term premia. Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2019) employ a VAR model that allows shocks to a¤ect second moments, and show that contractionary monetary policy shocks are associated with higher macroeconomic volatility. They interpret this fact with a nonlinear DSGE framework featuring Epstein-Zin preferences and labor market frictions, and show that such frictions, joint with policy rate gradualism, are important for describing their stylized facts. Following the keywords approach proposed by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) , Husted, Rogers, and Sun (2018) construct a newsbased index of monetary policy uncertainty to capture the degree of uncertainty that the public perceives about central bank policy actions and their consequences. Working with a variety of di¤erent VARs, they …nd that positive shocks to monetary policy uncertainty raise credit spreads and reduce output, with e¤ects that are comparable in magnitude to those of conventional monetary policy shocks.
As anticipated above, …scal policy uncertainty is also present in a number of countries. Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) When coupling these estimated processes with a nonlinear DSGE framework, they …nd that a jump in …scal policy uncertainty is clearly detrimental for the US business cycle. Ricco, Callegari, and Cimadomo (2016) propose a novel index which measures the coordination e¤ects of policy communication on private agents'expectations. Such index is based on the disagreement amongst US professional forecasters about future government spending. When modeling this index with selected macroeconomic aggregates in a nonlinear VAR framework, they …nd that, in times of low disagreement, the output response to …scal spending innovations is positive and large, mainly due to private investment response. Conversely, periods of elevated disagreement are characterized by muted output response. Mumtaz and Surico (2018) estimate a volatility-in-mean VAR framework to study the e¤ects of …scal spending, tax, and public debt volatility on the US economy. They …nd debt uncertainty to have the largest impact on real activity.
Finally, a contribution on the role of political uncertainty in the US in the aftermath of the global …nancial crisis is Born and Pfeifer (2014a) .
"Natural experiments" as the Brexit referendum are also informative on the cost of uncertainty. The Brexit event is unusual because it is a rare example of very persistent uncertainty shock -three years after the "leave" decision, the UK had not left the European Union yet, and uncertainty on the implementation of the exit strategy was still substantial. Bloom, Bunn, Chen, Mizen, Smietanka, and Thwaites (2019) exploit data from the Decision Maker Panel (DMP), which is a large survey of UK …rms currently featuring about 3,000 respondents per month, to gauge the costs of Brexit for the UK economy. Using a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach, they …nd the high and persistent uncertainty related to Brexit to have negatively impacted investment (about 11% over the three years following the June2016 vote) and productivity (2% to 5% over the same time span). They associate the drop in productivity to the time managers need to spend to sort out the consequences of Brexit and re-plan. Also, more productive, internationally-exposed, …rms are found to be more negatively impacted than less productive ones. Born, Müller, Schularick, and Sedlacek (2019) employ synthetic control methods and …nd the output loss for the UK due to Brexit to be about 2.4 percent by
year-end 2018. Using an expectations-augmented VAR, they …nd that this loss is to a large extent associated to a drop in growth expectations in response to the vote. While these studies point to large costs associated to the uncertainty generated by the "leave" decision by the UK, other investigations point to a more moderate contribution. Steinberg (2019) works with a DSGE model with heterogeneous …rms, endogenous export participation, and stochastic trade costs to quantify the impact of uncertainty about post-Brexit trade policies. He calibrates the model on 2011 data (when Brexit was not predictable), then assumes that either a "soft Brexit" or a "hard Brexit" could realize in the future, the latter scenario being characterized by higher trading costs after leaving the EU. According to his simulations, the total consumption-equivalent welfare cost of Brexit for UK households is between 0.4 and 1.2 percent. However, less than a quarter of a percent of this cost is due to uncertainty.
Other events that might generate uncertainty are elections. Following Jurado et al.'s (2015) econometric strategy, Redl (2019) employs a data-rich approach to construct proxies for …nancial and macroeconomic uncertainty for eleven developed countries. He combines this information with the one regarding close elections, which he interprets as macro uncertainty-generators, and periods of …nancial stress, which he associates to exogenous changes in …nancial uncertainty. He …nds evidence in favor of the contractionary e¤ects of macroeconomic uncertainty shocks, which emerge as more powerful drivers of the business cycle than …nancial uncertainty disturbances.
These empirical …ndings point to the need of understanding how to conduct macroeconomic policies in presence of uncertainty. Bloom (2009) points to a trade-o¤ between policy "correctness" and "decisiveness", and conjectures that it may better to act decisively (even if occasionally incorrectly) than to deliberate on policy, which could generate uncertainty. Theoretical and empirical investigations of this conjecture are warranted.
8) Monetary policymakers act as risk managers. Evans, Fisher, Gourio, and Krane (2015) estimate a battery of Taylor rules and show that the Greenspan period can be described by a systematic response of the policy rate to measures of uncertainty even after controlling for in ‡ation and output (which are the typical arguments on the right-hand side of a monetary policy rule). Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Nodari (2018) elaborate on Evans et al. (2015) and show that the evidence in favor of a risk management approach by the Federal Reserve and conditional on …nancial volatility is con…ned to the Greenspan-Bernanke policy regimes. Moreover, they propose a novel object, i.e., the risk management-driven policy rate gap, which measures the impact of the risk management approach by the Fed on the federal funds rate. They …nd the risk management-driven policy rate gap to be as large as 75 basis points (equivalent to three standard policy moves by the Federal Reserve) in correspondence with …nancial volatility-triggering events such as the Black Monday and the 2008 credit crunch. Castelnuovo (2019) estimates the response of the US yield curve to a change in US …nancial uncertainty as proxied by the …nancial uncertainty measure constructed by Ludvigson et al. (2019) . He …nds both short and long term rates to temporarily decrease, with the yield curve steepening in the short run before going back to its pre-shock slope. Ponomareva, Sheen, and Wang (2019) construct a novel measure of uncertainty using data on monetary policy recommendations given by members of the shadow board of Reserve Bank of Australia. They …nd that the Reserve Bank of Australia tends to lower the cash rate when predictions about the future policy decisions by the RBA are very di¤erent among experts, a result that is robust to using other measures of uncertainty. This evidence is consistent with the risk management approach mentioned above. However, it has to be kept in mind that other contributions on Taylor rules point to a systematic response by monetary policymakers to indicators such as, for instance, money growth (Ireland (2001) , Castelnuovo (2007) , Canova and Menz (2011), Castelnuovo (2012) ), credit spreads (Castelnuovo (2003) , Caldara and Herbst (2018) ), stock prices (Castelnuovo and Nisticò (2010) , Furlanetto (2011) ), or to richer policy rate dynamics (Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) , Ascari, Castelnuovo, and Rossi (2011) , Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011, 2012) . Then, is the evidence in favor of a systematic response to measures of uncertainty actually speaking in favor of other omitted variables in the Taylor rule? Horse races contrasting di¤erent estimated simple rules could provide us with relevant information to answer this question.
9) The real e¤ects of uncertainty shocks are stronger in developing countries. Developing countries experience more volatile business cycles than developed ones. Koren and Tenreyro (2007) point out three reasons to interpret this fact. First, developing countries tend to have less diversi…ed economies. For instance, they produce and export less products, so their economies are more exposed to demand ‡uctuations for those goods. In other words, they have a less diversi…ed portfolio of products, and such portfolio bears a higher risk. Second, part of the goods they trade are commodities, whose prices are pretty volatile. Third, developing countries are more subject to shocks such as coups, revolutions, wars, natural disasters, and have less e¤ective stabilizing macroeconomic policies. Koren and Tenreyro (2007) perform a volatility-accounting analysis and …nd that the choice of specializing in more volatile sectors account for roughly …fty percent of the di¤erence in volatility between developing and developed countries, while more frequent and severe aggregate shocks explains the remaining …fty percent.
What do we know about the e¤ects of uncertainty shocks in developing countries? Chatterjee (2018) …nds that they trigger sharper declines in consumption, investment, GDP and a stronger countercyclical response in trade-balances in emerging countries compared to advanced economies. In a related paper, Chatterjee (2019) interprets this fact with a higher degree of …nancial frictions estimated for the set of emerging economies she consider. Bhattarai, Chatterjee, and Park (2019) study the spillover e¤ects of US uncertainty shocks in a panel VAR of …fteen emerging market economies (EMEs). A US uncertainty shock negatively a¤ects EME's output, consumer prices, stock prices, exchange rates, and capital in ‡ows while raising spreads and net exports.
The negative e¤ects on output and asset prices are weaker, but the e¤ects on external balance stronger, for Latin American EMEs. Bhattarai, Chatterjee, and Park (2019) attribute such heterogeneity to di¤erent monetary policy responses by Latin American countries to US uncertainty shocks. An analysis of central bank minutes con…rms that Latin American EMEs pay less attention to smoothing capital ‡ows. Exploiting a large database covering 143 countries, Ahir, Bloom, and Furceri (2018) …nd that innovations in a novel measure of uncertainty at a world level (explained in the next Section) foreshadow signi…cant declines in output in all countries, but in particular in emerging countries characterized by lower institutional quality. Further investigations on the role of uncertainty in developing countries seem to represent a promising way to go for a more complete understanding of the role of uncertainty shocks.
The use of data from emerging countries should help econometricians overcome the endogeneity issue naturally a¤ecting empirical studies involving uncertainty and business cycle measures. This because emerging countries are typically hit by external shocks coming from the rest of the world, which are likely to be exogenous to emerging countries' business cycles (Bloom (2017) ). Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana, Rubio-Ramírez, and Uribe (2011) document the time-varying volatility in the world real interest rates faced by Argentina, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Brazil. After estimating a process for the real interest rate featuring stochastic volatility, they feed it into a nonlinear open economy framework and show that, for these countries, an increase in real interest rate volatility triggers a fall in output, consumption, investment, and hours worked, and a notable change in the current account of the economy. Born and Pfeifer (2014b) reach the same qualitative (although di¤erent quantitative) conclusions. 10) Uncertainty is harmful for trade. Baley, Veldkamp, and Waugh (2019) work with a trade model with information frictions. In equilibrium, hikes in uncertainty increase both the mean and the variance in returns to exporting. This implies that trade can increase or decrease with uncertainty depending on preferences. Higher uncertainty may lead to increases in trade because agents receive improved terms of trade, particularly in states of nature where consumption is most valuable. Trade creates value, in part, by o¤ering a mechanism to share risk and risk sharing is most countries from 1996 onwards. They note that, after having remained relatively sta-ble for about 20 years, the index has dramatically increased since 2016. According to their estimates, the increase in trade uncertainty observed in the …rst quarter could be enough to reduce global growth by up to 0.75 percentage points in 2019. While the question on the relationship between uncertainty and trade is still an open one, our understanding is that the empirical evidence cumulated so far tends to speak in favor of a negative relationship. Caldara, Iacoviello, Molligo, Prestipino, and Ra¤o (2019) construct various measures of trade policy uncertainty (TPU) by exploiting information coming from newspapers, …rms'earnings conference calls, and data on tari¤ rates. Then, they work with local projections and VAR analysis to quantify the e¤ects of TPU shocks on investment and real activity using …rm-level as well as macroeconomic data.
They …nd a one-standard deviation increase in TPU uncertainty to imply a reduction in investment of about -2% over one year. They interpret this fact via a two-country general equilibrium model featuring nominal rigidities and …rms'export participation decisions. The model predicts, very much like the data, that news and increased uncertainty about higher future tari¤s are contractionary. All in all, the literature seems to be converging toward an agreement on the negative role that uncertainty has on trade and the business cycle.
3 Uncertainty spillovers and global uncertainty: What does the literature say?
Most of the empirical analysis on the macroeconomic e¤ects of uncertainty shocks have entertained the assumption of "autarkic" economies, i.e., economies where domestic shocks are the unique drivers of the business cycle. However, a fast growing literature has recently focused on the e¤ects of external shocks. Two strands can be identi…ed.
The …rst one deals with uncertainty spillovers, i.e., the e¤ects on a country i of an hike in uncertainty originating in a country j, with i 6 = j. The second one focuses on global uncertainty, a concept that regards uncertainty-inducing events occurring all around the globe. We analyze these two interconnected strands of the literature in turn.
Uncertainty spillovers. Colombo (2013) estimates a VAR framework modelling US and Euro area indicators and …nds that a jump in economic policy uncertainty in the former area exerts a signi…cant e¤ect on in ‡ation and output in the latter. A similar exercise, which also proposes a novel measure of uncertainty for China, is conducted by Huang, Tong, Qiu, and Shen (2018) . They …nd the spillover e¤ect to be unidirectional and go from the US to China. Klöß ner and Sekkel (2014) study economic policy un-certainty spillovers for Canada, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom and United States. They …nd sizeable spillovers across countries, with the US and the UK playing the role of big exporters of uncertainty during the Great Recession. Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Figueres (2019) estimate a non-linear smooth-transition VAR model designed to quantify the e¤ects of US EPU shocks on the Canadian economy when the latter is in an economic boom vs. bust. They …nd that such shocks exert a substantial e¤ect on the Canadian unemployment rate, with a stronger e¤ect when the Canadian economy's growth rate is below its historical average. Interestingly, evidence of negative spillovers is present also when analyzing the US-UK economies, with EPU shocks in the former a¤ecting unemployment in the latter. Benigno, Benigno, and Nisticò (2012) estimate the macroeconomic e¤ects of a jump in the US monetary policy uncertainty for the G7 countries. Their VAR analysis …nds an increase in monetary policy uncertainty to be followed by an appreciation of the US dollar in the medium run. Di¤erently, an increase in the volatility of productivity leads to a dollar depreciation. They propose a general-equilibrium theory of exchange rate determination based on the interaction between monetary policy and time-varying uncertainty which is able to replicate their stylized facts. Angelini, Costantini, and Easaw (2018) investigate macroeconomic uncertainty shocks spillovers in four Eurozone countries. They work with a VAR model featuring a core economy (Germany) and an Euro area periphery (France, Italy, Spain).
Uncertainty shocks are allowed to spread from one country to another, with potential feedback from the periphery economies to the core one. They …nd evidence in favor of uncertainty spillovers among the Eurozone countries, with some feedback from periphery economies to the core economies during the …nancial crisis period. Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana, Rubio-Ramírez, and Uribe (2011) document the timevarying volatility in the world real interest rate faced by four emerging economies, i.e., Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Then, they feed this process in a smallscale open economy model approximated at the third order around the steady state to account for the role of uncertainty and, consequently, precautionary savings. They show that, in equilibrium, a jump in the real interest rate volatility triggers a fall in consumption, investment, hours, and debt. Born and Pfeifer (2014b) con…rm that a jump in interest rate volatility implies a negative response of the business cycle in the four Latin American countries indicated above (although their estimates point to a milder response of real activity than the one documented in Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana, Rubio-Ramírez, and Uribe (2011)). Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2015b) use a volatility-in-mean VAR and …nd that a one standard deviation increase in the volatility of the shock to US real GDP leads to a decline in UK GDP of 1% relative to trend and a 0.7% increase in UK CPI relative to trend at the two-year horizon. They show that these facts are consistent with the predictions coming from a nonlinear open-economy DSGE model in which foreign "supply" shocks are simulated.
Carrière-Swallow and Céspedes (2013) quantify the e¤ects of uncertainty spillovers by studying large jumps in the US …nancial volatility. Working with data related to 40 countries (20 developed, 20 emerging), they …nd heterogenous e¤ects of uncertainty shocks. Developed economies su¤er less in relative terms with respect to EMEs, which experience substantially more severe falls in investment and private consumption following an exogenous uncertainty shock, take signi…cantly longer to recover, and do not experience a subsequent overshoot in activity. Carrière-Swallow and Céspedes (2013) show that the credit channel can account for up to one-half of the increased fall in investment generated by uncertainty shocks among EMEs with less-developed …nancial markets. As already pointed out above, Bhattarai, Chatterjee, and Park (2019) ing to a similar word-reading technique, Ahir, Bloom, and Furceri (2018) construct a World Uncertainty Index (WUI) for 143 individual countries from 1996 onwards. This is de…ned using the frequency of the word "uncertainty" in the Economist Intelligence Unit country reports. Globally, WUI spikes near the 9/11 attack, SARS outbreak, Gulf War II, Euro debt crisis, El Niño, European border crisis, UK Brexit vote and the 2016 US election. Uncertainty spikes tend to be more synchronized within advanced economies and between economies with tighter trade and …nancial linkages. The level of uncertainty is signi…cantly higher in developing countries and is positively associated with economic policy uncertainty and stock market volatility, and negatively with GDP growth. Running a panel vector autoregressive analysis, Ahir, Bloom, and Furceri (2018) …nd a jump in WUI equal to change in the average value of the index from 2014 to 2016 to be associated to a drop in output of about 1.4 percent after 10 quarters. Caldara and Iacoviello (2017) construct a monthly indicator of geopolitical risk based on a tally of newspaper articles covering geopolitical tensions, and examine its evolution and e¤ects since 1985. The geopolitical risk (GPR) index spikes around the Gulf War, after 9/11, during the 2003 Iraq invasion, during the 2014 Russia-Ukraine crisis, and after the Paris terrorist attacks. A VAR analysis based on monthly, post-1985 US data point to a decline in real activity, lower stock returns, and movements in capital ‡ows away from emerging economies and towards advanced economies following an unexpected increase in GPR. Moving from text-based investigations to model-based ones, Redl (2017) employs the methodology proposed by Jurado et al. (2015) to construct a global macroeconomic uncertainty index with a variety of macro and …nancial aggregates of industrialized countries around the world with the exception of the UK. Such global index correlates with both the UK macro uncertainty index constructed by the same author (0.52), and with the UK …nancial uncertainty one (0.74). 1 Berger, Grabert, and Kempa (2016) use real GDP quarterly data of 20 OECD countries spanning the period 1970Q1-2013Q4 to identify global and country-speci…c measures uncertainty for a large OECD country sample via a dynamic factor model with stochastic volatility. Their evidence points to major jumps in global uncertainty in the early 1970s and late 2000s, and a number of periods with elevated levels of either global or national uncertainty, particularly in the early 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. VAR impulse responses of national macroeconomic variables reveal that global uncertainty is a major driver of the business cycle in most countries, whereas the impact of national uncertainty is small and frequently insigni…cant. Their evidence points to investment and trade ‡ows (as opposed to consumption) as the main transmitters of global uncertainty shocks to the business cycle. In a related paper, Berger, Grabert, and Kempa (2017) identify global macroeconomic uncertainty using a dynamic factor model with stochastic volatility. Applying this methodology to quarterly output and in ‡ation data for 20 OECD countries over the period 1970Q1-2012Q4, they …nd the early 1970s and early 1980s recessions as well as the Great Recession to be associated with increases in uncertainty at the global level. Global uncertainty is also found to negatively a¤ect country-level business cycles and raise in ‡ation rates.
Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2015a) employ a factor model with stochastic volatility to model quarterly macroeconomic and …nancial variables of 11 OECD countries over the period 1960Q1-2013Q3. They decompose the time-varying variance of macroeconomic and …nancial variables into contributions from country-speci…c uncertainty and uncertainty common to all countries. They …nd that global uncertainty plays an important role in driving the time-varying volatility of nominal and …nancial variables, and that the cross-country co-movement in volatility of real and …nancial variables has increased over time. They interpret their empirical facts with a two-country DSGE model featuring Epstein-Zin preferences. Such model points to increased globalization and trade openness as the possible forces behind the increased cross-country correlation in volatility. Carriero, Corsello, and Marcellino (2019) study the drivers of country-speci…c in ‡ation rates using a framework that allows for commonality in both levels and volatilities, in addition to country-speci…c components. They …nd that a substantial fraction of country-level in ‡ation volatility can be attributed to a global factor that is also driving in ‡ation levels and their persistence. The evolution of the Chinese PPI and oil in ‡ation is found to be relevant to understand that of global in ‡ation, above all since the 1990s. Kang, Ratti, and Vespignani (2017) construct a global …nancial uncertainty index by conducting a principal component analysis based on monthly data on stock market volatility for 15 OECD countries. Then they run a VAR analysis that models their global uncertainty proxy jointly with measures of global output growth, global in ‡ation, and global interest rates. Such global indicators are factors extracted from data of 40 OECD countries. They …nd a signi…cant drop in global output and in ‡ation after a jump in global uncertainty. Bonciani and Ricci (2018) construct a proxy for global …nancial uncertainty by extracting a factor from about 1,000 risky asset returns from around the world. They study how shocks to the factor a¤ect economic activity in 36 advanced and emerging small open economies over the 1990-2017 sample by estimating local projections in a panel regression framework. While …nding cross-country heterogeneity, the e¤ect of a jump in …nancial uncertainty is in general recessionary. Such e¤ects are found to be stronger in countries with a higher degree of trade and/or …nancial openness, higher levels of external debt, less developed …nancial sectors, and higher risk rating. Mumtaz and Musso (2018) build a dynamic factor model with time-varying parameters and stochastic volatility and use it to decompose the variance of a large set of quarterly …nancial and macroeconomic variables for 22 OECD countries spanning the sample 1960-2016 into contributions from country and region-speci…c uncertainty vs.
from uncertainty common to all countries. They …nd that global uncertainty plays a primary role in explaining the volatility of in ‡ation, interest rates and stock prices, although to a varying extent over time. Region-speci…c uncertainty drives most of the exchange rate volatility for all Euro Area countries and for countries in North-America and Oceania, while uncertainty at all levels contribute to explaining the volatility of real activity, credit, and money for most countries. All uncertainty measures are found to be countercyclical and positive correlated with in ‡ation. Carriero, Clark, and Marcellino (2018) use a large VAR to measure international macroeconomic uncertainty and its e¤ects on major economies with a large VAR in which the error volatilities evolve over time according to a factor structure. The volatility of each variable in the system re- ‡ects time-varying common (global) components and idiosyncratic components. In this model, global uncertainty is allowed to contemporaneously a¤ect the economies of the included nations-both the levels and volatilities of the included variables. The analysis focuses alternatively on quarterly GDP growth rates for 19 industrialized countries covering the 1985Q1-2016Q3 period and on a larger set of macroeconomic indicators for the U.S., Euro area, and United Kingdom spanning the 1985Q4-2013Q3 sample. Their estimates yield new measures of international macroeconomic uncertainty, and indicate that uncertainty shocks (surprise increases) lower GDP and many of its components, adversely a¤ect labor market conditions, lower stock prices, and in some economies lead to an easing of monetary policy. Ozturk and Sheng (2018) develop monthly measures of macroeconomic uncertainty covering 45 countries and construct measures of common and country-speci…c uncertainty using individual survey data from the Consensus Forecasts over the period of 1989-2014. Using a VAR analysis, they show that global uncertainty shocks are followed by a large and persistent negative response in real economic activity, whereas idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks are not found to be relevant drivers of the business cycle. Cesa-Bianchi, Pesaran, and Rebucci (2018) employ a multi-country model to compute two common factors, a "real" and a "…nancial" one.
These factors are identi…ed by assuming di¤erent patterns of cross-country correlations of country-speci…c innovations to real GDP growth and realized stock market volatility. They …nd that most of the unconditional correlation between volatility and growth can be accounted for by the real common factor. However, shocks to the common …nancial factor also have a large and persistent impact on growth. In contrast, country-speci…c volatility shocks account for a moderate amount of the growth forecast error variance.
Global Financial Uncertainty: Evolution and effects
We now propose novel results on the global e¤ects of uncertainty shocks. To do so, we construct a new measure of global …nancial uncertainty (GFU henceforth). This measure is constructed via a principal component analysis that considers three measures of volatility of …nancial returns constructed at a monthly level by considering stock market returns, exchange rate returns, and 10-year government bond yields for 39 countries from July 1992, to April 2018. 2 According to the International Monetary Fund, these 39 countries account for more than 80% of the 2019 GDP (based on purchased power parity) at a world level. 3 Figure 1 plots the GFU series. It is immediate to appreciate the truly global nature of this uncertainty measure, which peaks in correspondence of events occurred all around the globe such as, for instance, the EMS collapse, the Asian crisis, the Russian one, 9/11, the second Gulf War, the Madrid attacks, the European …nancial turmoils, those related to the Chinese credit and …nancial sector, and -above all -the global …nancial crisis. This last event identi…es the global maximum of the GFU series.
It is of interest to compare the GTU series with two other …nancial indicators recently proposed by the literature. The …rst one is the US …nancial uncertainty index 2 Missing observations are dealt with by following the approach developed by Banbura and Modugno (2014) . A version of GFU constructed via a dynamic hierarchical factor model to control for regional and country-speci…c uncertainty factors is proposed by constructed by Ludvigson, Ma, and Ng (2019) . Such index is the time-varying volatility of the one-step ahead forecast errors related to 148 monthly …nancial series and computed over the period 1960-2018. 4 They …nd a jump in the US-related measure of …nancial uncertainty to be a driver of the US economic cycle. The second …nancial indicator -related to credit -is the one constructed by Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2019), who work with a dynamic factor model to model 858 series on risky asset prices traded on all the major global markets, corporate bond indices, and commodities price series over the sample 1990 to 2012. 5 They …nd that one global factor explains about 20% of the variance in the data. To what extent ‡uctuations in global …nancial uncertainty, proxied by the GFU series, can be relevant to understand the world business cycle? We address this question by running a VAR analysis jointly modeling GFU, the global credit cycle by Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2019), and the world's real GDP quarterly growth rate, which we proxy with the one of the OECD total area. 7 We compute the impulse responses of the global credit cycle, the world's real GDP quarterly growth rate, and GFU by proceeding as follows. First, we estimate a reduced-form VAR modeling these three series over the period 1992Q3-2012Q4 (the beginning of the sample being that of the GFU measure, and the end being due to the availability of the global credit cycle).
The VAR features two lags as suggested by standard information criteria. Given that the output growth measure is available at a quarterly frequency, we construct quarterly series of GFU and the global credit cycle by taking within-quarter averages of the monthly values. Second, we move from the reduced-form representation of the data to a structural one by assuming that the contemporaneous relationships among the three variables we model are captured by a lower triangular matrix whose coe¢ cients we obtain by computing the Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix of the reduced-form residuals.
As it is well known, this identi…cation strategy implies that the ordering of the variables in the VAR matters. We order the global credit cycle indicator …rst, GFU second, and output third. The ordering is justi…ed by the following reasons. First, as pointed out by Stock and Watson (2012) , it is extremely challenging to separate …rst and second-moment …nancial shocks. Hence, given the relevance of …rst moment shocks for the global business cycle (a prominent example being the Great Recession), we put uncertainty measure is available at https://sites.google.com/site/redlchris/research . We thank Andrea Carriero and Haroon Mumtaz for sharing the estimated global uncertainty measures documented in (respectively) Carriero, Clark, and Marcellino (2019) and Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2017) . 7 The series can be downloaded from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis'database available at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/ . The code of the series is NAEXKP01O1Q657S. the global credit cycle …rst to be conservative and avoid assigning to …nancial uncertainty shocks the role possibly played by …rst moment …nancial shocks in explaining the contemporaneous responses of …nancial and real variables to an exogenous jump in uncertainty. Consequently, our …ndings should be interpreted as a lower bound as far as the real e¤ects of an uncertainty shock are concerned. We order GFU before output because Granger causality tests conducted with a bivariate VAR speak loud: GFU is found to Granger cause output (the p-value is basically zero), while output is found to not Granger cause GFU (p-value: 0.84). Figure 3 plots the impulse responses of the three variables to a GTU shock (size -one standard deviation). All variables respond signi…cantly and persistently. In the short run, …nancial stress increases (i.e., the …nancial markets go bust), uncertainty increases, and output growth registers negative values. Our VAR assigns about 18% of the forecast error variance decomposition of output growth (computed by considering a forecast horizon h ! 1) to a GTU shock against 36% to a global credit cycle shock. 8
When swapping the global credit cycle and GFU in the vector, these …gures swap too, i.e., the VAR assigns 37% of the output growth forecast error variance decomposition to a GTU shock and 17% to a global credit cycle shock. This con…rms that our estimates are a lower bound, and that separately identify …nancial (in this case, credit) and uncertainty shocks is challenging. We also note that a shock to GTU negatively a¤ects the global credit cycle, at least in the short run. The response of global output to a GFU shock produced by our VAR is economically sizeable. To better appreciate this point, we propose the following back-of-the-envelope computation. The standard deviation of the GFU shock in Figure 3 is about 0.70. When checking the series of the estimated GFU shocks, one evident spike is the 2008Q3 one (value: 1.6). Then, we can calibrate the size of the shock hitting the global economy in 2008Q3 to be 1:6=0:70 2:3 standard deviations. The peak response of output in Figure   3 is about 0:15 percent. Hence, our linear VAR would suggest a 2:3( 0:15) 0:35 percent peak response of global output growth to such a shock. The peak response of the actual global output growth series during the Great Recession, which occurs in 2009Q1, 8 Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2019) document a signi…cant impact of monetary policy shocks originating in the US on the global …nancial cycle. We then run a robustness check by adding the shadow rate à la Wu and Xia (2016) (quarterly observations constructed by taking within-quarter averages) to the vector (ordered last). We notice three things. First, a GFU shock signi…cantly a¤ects all variables (shadow rate included). Second, the contribution of GFU shocks to the forecast error variance of global real output is slighly reduced (14%), but still clearly present. Third, the contribution of GFU shocks to the forecast error variance of the shadow rate is 19%, while that of monetary policy shocks to the forecast error variance of GFU is 5%. is 2:27 percent. Hence, our computation points to a contribution by GFU shocks to the drop in global output occurred during the Great Recession of about 1/6-1/7. A …nal note regards the global ‡avor of the GFU measure used in this paper. As documented above, the correlation between the US …nancial uncertainty measure constructed by Ludvigson, Ma, and Ng (2019) and GFU is high. However, the two series carry a di¤erent type of information. When replacing GFU with the US-speci…c measure of …nancial uncertainty in our VAR, we do not get the same dynamic response of global output to a US …nancial uncertainty shock. Figure 4 depicts such response, which is quantitatively much more modest than the one documented in Figure 3 and not signi…cant from a statistical standpoint. We interpret this result in favor of GFU as a truly global indicator, as opposed to the US …nancial uncertainty index proposed by Ludvigson, Ma, and Ng (2019) which, by construction, focuses on the US …nancial market. It is important to note, however, that a shock to the US …nancial uncertainty measure does trigger a signi…cant response of the global credit cycle.
Conclusions
This survey has reviewed the most recent empirical research on the role of domestic uncertainty, uncertainty spillovers, and global uncertainty for country-speci…c and global business cycles. We have presented and discussed ten main takeaways related to the literature on the macroeconomic e¤ects of domestic uncertainty. Then, we have reviewed recent contributions on uncertainty spillovers, global uncertainty, and their e¤ects at a country and global level. Finally, we have proposed a novel measure of global …nancial uncertainty, constructed as a weighted-average of measures of …nancial volatility for 39 countries. A VAR analysis conducted by modeling such a measure, a proxy for the global business cycle, and one for the global credit cycle points to a signi…cant role played by unexpected changes in global …nancial uncertainty as a driver of the global business cycle. Our estimates suggest that the contribution of global …nancial uncertainty shocks to the peak response of world output during the Great Recession could be as large as 1/6-1/7.
Since the Great Recession, a lot of research has been undertaken to understand the macroeconomic e¤ects of uncertainty. Much still has to be done to fully understand how to deal with uncertainty at a domestic and, in light of numerous events around the world, global level. As Bloom (2014) 
